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Concessions, Conflicts and Collusion: 
Graziers and Shearing Workers, 1946-1956 
by Kosmas Tsokhas 
Recent studies of production relations in the Australian wool industry 
have focussed on the nineteenth century experience and the strikes 
of the 1890s in particular. The AustraUan Workers' Union (AWU) has 
been the subject of some fine histories, but twentieth century 
developments have received little attention. This article deals with the 
causes of the most important general strike in the industry since the 
1890s, the 1956 strike which culminated the post war boom in the 
wool industry. In the 1890s the AWU was defeated because the forces 
of the state were aligned directly against it. The strike occurred in 
a period of deep and lasting depression without the mediating 
influence of an award or the arbitration system. The defeat of the 
union encouraged its leaders to explore a more co-operative approach 
to industrial relations and made a system of arbitration and 
conciliation more attractive to them.' 
By the 1940s the AWU had developed a sound working relationship 
with the employers and a commitment to arbitrated conflict resolution 
rather than collective bargaining. The end of the Second World War 
promised some freeing-up of the labor market. The wartime 
regulations supposedly introduced to place ceilings on wages were 
terminated. Formal sanctions against the withdrawal of labor through 
strikes were eased. Immigration schemes and the shrinking of the 
armed forces expanded the number of wage-laborers. But the 
employers were concerned that the affects of these changes would only 
be felt gradually and labor shortages would continue, at least for the 
immediate post-war years. The rapid expansion in the number of sheep 
after the war led to the possibility of a more long-term imbalance 
between the supply of and demand for shearing labor. The 
deregulation of investment after the war, soaring wool prices between 
1947-48 and 1951-52, and the decimation of rabbits by myxomatosis 
all gave rise to a growth in flock sizes and an increase of around 40 
per cent in wool output in the decade after 1946. Woolgrowers began 
to worry about the price of labor. They also realized that prosperity 
and large profits made it difficult to justify any stubborn opposition 
to wage increases. And most graziers were keen to get their wool off 
the sheep's back and onto the auction floor with a minimum of fuss 
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and bother. The majority of woolgrowers could afford to pay what 
their shearing employees were asking. Grazier organizations and the 
AWU leaders tried to institutionaUze the process of wage fixation by 
agreeing to regular rises in rates of pay. In 1954-55 the boom broke, 
but pastoral investment continued to expand, albeit at a slower rate. 
Once wool prices began to fall in the mid-1950s conflicts intensified 
between graziers and the AWU, and between the dominant faction 
in the AWU and many rank-and-file members. These frictions 
contributed to a national strike in 1956. The immediate cause of this 
strike was a successful attempt by employers to reverse the upward 
drift in wages by means of a reduction in shearing rates. This resulted 
in a new phase of instability in the balance of forces between graziers 
and shearing workers in the industry. The employees went on the 
offensive and the employers' leadership was divided and confused as 
to how to cope with the resistance of pastoral workers to the 
implementation of the new, lower award rates. 
TACTICAL RETREAT 
In the period 1945-46 to 1956-57 the pastoral industry had a 
considerable capacity to pay, with wool prices, numbers of sheep and 
the volume of wool production rising rapidly. There were only 
occasional slumps in wool prices. With the exception of 1951-52 and 
1954-55 the gross value of wool production was also increasing. It 
is interesting to note that the number of shearing machines grew more 
or less in step with the number of sheep, suggesting that investment 
on plant and equipment was keeping up with the mounting number 
of sheep to be shorn. Sharp falls in nominal and real wool prices 
occurred in 1954-55 and 1955-56. At the same time, as the table shows, 
shearers' rates per 100 sheep in 1956 were over 300 per cent higher 
than they had been in 1946. Over the same period total shearing costs 
per head of sheep had doubled. As long as wool prices continued 
on their upward trajectory and incomes were high, this movement in 
shearing costs did not create a great deal of concern. But with the 
faU in wool prices in 1954-55 and 1955-56 shearing rates came to be 
perceived as excessive, although as we shall see later in this article, 
different groups of graziers reacted with varying intensity.^ Until 
1956 the employers avoided a head-on assault against their employees 
because this was likely to fail. They concentrated on helping the AWU 
to maintain its authority over its members. Grazier leaders also 
recognized that the arbitration system had to be seen to be delivering 
wage increases. If this did not happen employees would be more likely 
to resort to collective bargaining. The employers evolved a consensual 
strategy. They would allow employees to share in the post-war boom 
in wool prices by conceding a wool value allowance to the AWU. This 
allowance would attract labor into the industry and so reduce the 
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bargaining power of employees. It would also reinforce the AWU's 
absorption into the arbitration system. The employers were convinced 
that wages set by station-specific collective bargaining would be 
disastrously higher than the wool value allowance. 
Shearers' Rates per 100 Sheep and Estimated Cost per Head of Sheep 1946-56 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Not Available 
Total Cost Per 
Head (cents) 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
17 
NA 
32 
33 
33 
35 
35 
Shearers' Rate 
Per 100 ($) 
4.68 
5.23 
6.05 
7.00 
10.00 
15.40 
12.75 
14.45 
14.60 
14.60 
14.60 
Source: Grazcos Cooperative, Shearing Costs. Australian National University Archives 
of Business and Labour, E266/115. 
Shearers were in a black mood at the end of the war. Their aggressive 
pursuit of over-award concessions created the preconditions for the 
employers' decision to propose a wool allowance. The Graziers' Co-
operative Shearing Co reported of the 1947-48 season that it was a 
difficult one, due to the general shortage of labor: 'A certain amount 
of industrial trouble was experienced and demands for concessions 
were made by some of the teams'.^ But the company stuck to the 
award and all sheep were shorn. Others did not remain firm. In 
Queensland the shearing was 'difficult' and Communist Party 
committees were blamed as many shearers seemed 'to be throwing 
over the A.W.U. and resorting to direct action trusting that the 
necessities of the various stations will force them to agree to their 
terms in order to get the wool off their sheep'." In Tasmania wet 
weather delayed the shearing in 1949-50 and also increased the threat 
of blowflies. Hence graziers and station managers were quick to offer 
over-award payments. Such concessions were so widespread that the 
AWU used them as proof of a capacity to pay increased award 
rates.^ There was evidence of a medley of over-award payments in 
1948 and 1949. Employers were more amenable to requests for special 
payments for the wear and tear of combs and cutters. Compensatory 
payments were made when accommodation was not up to standard. 
The likelihood of offering extra money increased if grass seeds and 
blowflies were posing a menace. Owners with less than five stands 
were most desperate for labor, because under conditions of over-full 
employment in the industry their small flocks did not attract 
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contractors or shearing laborers. In the north, north-west and central 
districts of New South Wales higher crutching rates were conceded 
on many stations.*• 
Shearers refused to work with old or fauUy machines.' In 1949 
many AWU members did not sign agreements until the day on which 
they commenced work. This was a major threat to the ability of 
employers to enforce award conditions, as shearers who did not sign 
the agreement were legally free to bargain for conditions over and 
above those listed in the agreement.^ Labor shortages also made it 
more likely that there would be an easing of work effort. This was 
described by the industrial officer of the Graziers' Federal CouncU 
of Australia before Arbitration Commissioner J.R. Donovan on 12 
June 1952. He used Midkin station as an illustration: 
The output was examined and the shed was working smoothly, but 
if you observed the work at the tables and the work of the pickers-
up, you would have seen that there were many cases where the fleece 
was thrown on to the table in a tangle. The fleeces were not thrown 
beautifully, and 50% of them were thrown up badly. The wool rollers 
who were skirting were not pressed; they worked casually and 
although there was a vast output of fleeces, there was no real pressure 
on them.' 
In Queensland shearers refused to shear sheep with scabby mouth, 
even though they were required to do so if the employer had made 
a reasonable effort to separate them out from the rest of the flock. 
In these cases the employers were reluctant to use their power under 
the award to withhold money owed to the employees.'" In the post-
war decade the AWU took steps to counter a trend among employers 
to have shearers work on fully grown sheep, while lambs which were 
easier to shear were done by station hands, the owner himself or his 
sons. When shearers found a large proportion of wethers in a flock 
they would claim that there was an imbalance in the distribution of 
types of sheep." 
There was another reason why the employers wanted to concede 
the wool allowance: the AWU's inability to demobilize the rank-and-
file movement. In January 1948, T.D. Dougherty, the general secretary 
of the AWU, admitted as much when he noted that there had been 
many strikes, and that his union had stood aloof from this sea of 
troubles. The official position was in contrast to the approach of 
Communist Party members of the union. During the 1945-46 shearing 
they promoted a campaign for a 40 hour week in violation of the 44 
hour week set in the award. The general secretary in a strange twist 
of thinking claimed that the campaign for a 40 hour week was not 
an unjustified objective, but he still condemned it as part of the 
Communist Party's strategy for seizing control of the AWU. 
Communist Party members 'by exploiting the legitimate desire of 
shearers and shed hands for a 40-hour week' were out 'to sow distrust 
of A.W.U. officials in the minds of members, and thereby undermine 
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the Union'. He could not accept that these militants were popular 
with AWU members because they reflected their feelings and interests: 
'many good unionists were temporarily bamboozled into believing that 
these Communist auxiliaries. . . were active in their interests, and 
foolishly allowed themselves to be tricked, coerced or straight out 
bullied'. Eventually a compulsory conference with the employers saw 
them conceding the 40 hour week and a wool allowance, but 
Dougherty would not admit that these successes were due to rank-
and-file action.'^ In fact, the AWU leaders had been more than 
wiUing to join forces with the employers to check this attack on 
managerial authority and on Dougherty's own position within the 
AWU. 
If the AWU was pleased to throw cold water on mass action that 
challenged its authority, within its preferred field of battle it bargained 
cleverly with the employers.'^ In July 1952 Commissioner J.R. 
Donovan accepted a new log of claims by the AWU and granted an 
increase. After this success grazier leaders were in a quandry as to 
how they should approach future wage cases. In the opinion of the 
industrial officer of the Graziers' Federal Council, Donovan appeared 
to speak a different language from the employers. His judgements 
were not primarily the result of persuasive or rational argument. They 
were political decisions bound up with the Commissioner's desire to 
retain his authority and legitimacy in the eyes of the AWU. For the 
employers this was far from unacceptable. His decision in 1952 showed 
that given the distribution of power in the industry. Commissioner 
Donovan was keen to either avoid making a decision at all, or to try 
and make one which would satisfy both sides, but especially rank-
and-file pastoral workers who were aware of their superior bargaining 
power as a result of labor shortages and the rapid increase in the 
number of sheep since 1949: 
The decision was one of expediency. The Commissioner had no 
desire to accept any responsibility, as an arbitrator, for the amounts 
of the wool value allowances, he was anxious to produce rates 
satisfactory to the Union, and he had no wish to grant or refuse 
marginal increases as the subject of margins was extremely 
controversial at that time. His decision, if it is otherwise inconsistent, 
at least reconciled all these aims. The Union's case for increased 
margins is a strong one, if only on the ground of comparison with 
margins given under other awards. . . . If the wool value allowance 
were substantially reduced or eliminated, the Commissioner might 
feel that the co-relation between margins and wool value allowances 
no longer relieves him of the obligation to deal with margins.'" 
For graziers there were a number of interrelated considerations, 
which pointed towards a need to forestall protracted conflicts over 
pay and conditions. There was a calculated expectation that 
concessions negotiated with the AWU leaders would be less costly 
than those resulting from a general strike. There was also a broader 
concern shared with the Dougherty faction to institutionalize 
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bargaining over wages. Anything which bolstered the authority of the 
conservative ruUng faction of the AWU made it easier for this clique 
to counter the manoeuvres of left-wing groups and rank-and-file 
militants. The authority of this faction would be enhanced by its 
successful extraction of increased rates of pay from the employers. 
At the same time, the employers had to avoid giving the impression 
that they were content to meekly capitulate to the union rather than 
risk the outbreak of a strike. This could be interpreted as a lack of 
resolution and could lead to excessive demands from the AWU. P.A. 
Wright of the Graziers' Association of New South Wales pointed out 
in June 1947 that graziers needed to appreciate that there were limits 
to the compliance of the AWU leadership: 'whatever we do the AWU 
must remain in opposition to us and especially because of the set up 
of the AWU today, with the Left Wing pressing on every side more 
and more on the moderate side, the AWU must feel, in their own 
defence, that they must show a desire to be willing to fight their own 
battle and then there is the other side where the AWU may feel 
comfortable in meeting us in such circumstances.''^ J. Forrest of the 
Pastoralists' Association of Western AustraUa agreed that such dUly-
dallying could be interpreted as a 'sign of weakness', given 'the present 
conditions that are operating throughout Australia in connection with 
the labour market in relation to shearers'.'^ He elaborated: 'we wiU 
have probably to agree to what they demand and what they ask for 
. . . the conditions today are such that I do not think we should lead 
to a fight. We might fight a losing battle. That is the reason, and a 
wise reason, why we have granted the demands they have put before 
us'. ' ' And as the secretary of the Graziers' Federal CouncU noted in 
July 1947, in return for pay increases the AWU had, after all, agreed 
that it 'would resist any demands from extremists for extra payment 
and the union would play the game generaUy in regard to the 
agreement'.'^ 
The most important concession granted by graziers was the wool 
allowance, which operated from 1949 to 1954. The allowance involved 
extra payments to shearing employees in step with increases in the 
price of wool above a base level of 39.5d per lb. The advantages were 
outlined in an assessment prepared for the Graziers' Federal CouncU 
of Australia: 
Because shearing labour was scarce and employers were strongly 
disposed to make concessions, rates based solely on the award 
formulae would not, during this period, have been high enough to 
provide even a practicable starting point for the making of extra-
award bargains. The allowances set a standard of concessions 
acceptable to employers and employees. They were, by and large, 
an effective standard and produced a useful degree of stability. 
Total rates were high in relation to competing wage rates, and this, 
combined with the absence of industrial trouble has attracted labour 
to the industry and removed the scarcity which was a problem of 
the early post-war years." 
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Each year graziers and the AWU would negotiate a new wool 
allowance, and in 1950 it was increased to take account of higher wool 
prices. In return the AWU committed its members to work at these 
rates and no more. The employers were willing to surrender the wool 
allowance to the AWU's leadership rather than endure a continuation 
of collective bargaining. However, boom times would not last forever 
and if the wool value allowance were to be retained when wool prices 
fell below the minimum level at which the allowance could be paid, 
the AWU would press for a margins component to be added to the 
award. Declining wool prices also pushed some woolgrowers away 
from their defensive posture and towards a more aggressive approach. 
RESTRAINED OFFENSIVE 
After 1952 one of the main aspects of this new approach adopted 
by pastoral employers was a drive for an improvement in their 
disciplinary powers, so that employees would work intensively for the 
full labor-time for which they had been employed. In 1954 the 
Graziers' Federal Council moved to have the federal award varied so 
that if any employee was absent from work without a reasonable 
excuse on the day before or the day after a public holiday, he would 
not have to be paid for the hoUday. There was also a tendency for 
station managers and owners to enforce provisions in the award which 
enhanced their authority on the shed floor. In the first place, before 
work began shearers were required increasingly to draw lots for pens 
in the presence of the overseer; any exchange of pens had to be 
approved by the overseer. Second, despite the opposition of shearers, 
at a number of sheds the employers insisted that more than one wet 
sheep vote be taken on each day. The award allowed this, but in the 
past shearers had managed to ensure that only one vote was taken. 
If there was more than one vote it was possible that the second would 
reverse an earlier decision that sheep were too wet to shear, thus 
reducing the amount of working time lost. The custom of having only 
one wet sheep vote per day aUowed the shearers to go into town and 
make merry, rather than waiting around the station for half a day 
or so until another vote could be organized. Shearers had also been 
voting before the sheep had their fleeces scientificaUy tested for 
moisture content. This was not permitted by the award and shearers 
who did this were liable to prosecution and dismissal. For a decade 
or so graziers had been afraid to exercise such sanctions, but now a 
growing number were taking action against early votes. Some 
woolgrowers and station managers were even beginning to resist 
preference for
 unionists.^" 
With the AWU comfortably jousting against the employers within 
the arbitration system and the majority of shearing workers now 
looking hopefully to this system to defend their wages and influence 
within the relations of production, graziers started to take back what 
they had always believed to be rightly theirs. They began bit by bit 
296 
to assert their control over how work was done; they moved with 
growing success to intensify work effort and to demand obedience, 
but the employers did not go all the way. A decline in strikes and more 
widespread adherence to the award could not be risked through 
adventurism. Instead they came to an agreement with the AWU to 
do all possible to make sure that agreement forms were signed prior 
to the commencement of work. This was a major advantage for the 
employers, as such forms made it easier for them to deploy legal 
sanctions against shearing employees who were deemed to not be 
shearing competently and quickly, or who abandoned work before 
completing their contracts, and the greater the likelihood that 
discipline would prevail. For the AWU leaders there were also positive 
outcomes. Union members would be working under conditions settled 
through bargaining in courts and commissions, while there would be 
less scope for independent negotiating with individual graziers. The 
employers recognized that at a time of full employment, high wool 
prices and rising sheep numbers, a de-regulated labor market could 
only be to the advantage of the employees. Nevertheless, coUective 
bargaining did not cease and award rates of pay continued to rise. 
While Communist Party members were active within the AWU, their 
presence alone was not enough to explain the restlessness of pastoral 
workers. There was a tradition of rank-and-file self-organization 
within the AWU, and despite the wool allowance, in the 1950s local 
committees were especially active in Queensland and in New South 
Wales, where a radical central committee met regularly at Dubbo, the 
strategic focus of major droving routes. The first extended from the 
Darling Downs across the Namoi at Wee Waa and over the Castlereagh 
at Lee's station. The second, central route penetrated the Liverpool 
Ranges at Pandora's Pass, where it was joined by the eastern droveway 
which unrolled through New England and over the Macquarie River. 
The Dubbo committee coordinated the activities of a number of 
district committees, and it was one of the first targets of the employers' 
attack on indiscipline and award violations. The Graziers' Federal 
Council began legal proceedings under the Commonwealth Crimes 
Act against the committee's members and the publishers of its 
literature. The Graziers' Federal CouncU could take such proceedings 
with comparative ease, for it expected no opposition from the AWU 
leaders, having been informed as early as March 1952 that the AWU 
was 'not against our attacking the Dubbo Committee; as a matter 
of fact, earlier this year Mr. Dougherty asked whether we could do 
anything to prosecute
 them'.^' Nevertheless, there was an element of 
risk; if the prosecutions failed this could stimulate further rank-and-
file mobilization: 'In the past it has been hard to prove cases against 
these inciters, and there is no point in taking a case against them unless 
we are certain of success because if we. . . . lose it the Committee's 
status in the eyes of the men would be enhanced'.^^ Under section 
7A of the Commonwealth Crimes Act a person who encouraged a 
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violation of a Commonwealth law, or printed material designed to 
encourage a breach of such a law, could be fined £ 100, be imprisoned 
for 12 months, or both. Moreover, the Arbitration Advisory 
Committee of the Graziers' Federal Council was encouraged by the 
fact that the dominant faction in the AWU would 'not be embarrassed 
by a prosecution of members of the Dubbo Committee'.^^ Such 
collusion became more difficult when the employers decided to pursue 
a wage cut in 1956. 
THE 1956 STRIKE 
Despite these early steps towards a more confrontationist strategy 
grazier leaders remained indecisive. It would require further reductions 
in wool prices and the protracted strike in 1956 to push them onto 
a consistently offensive course. In 1954-55 there was a major fall in 
wool prices, so steps were taken by grazier organizations in Queensland 
and at the federal level to cut shearing rates. The employers decided 
to base their arguments for a reduction on the logic underlying the 
agreement with the AWU in 1949 that the wool allowance be 
determined according to changes in the price of wool. Since wool 
prices appeared to be drifting downwards this needed to be reflected 
in lower rates of pay. The resulting tensions and pressures between 
graziers and pastoral workers led to a major strike in 1956. The strike 
began in Queensland in January and lasted into October of the same 
year. The immediate cause was a decision by the Queensland Industrial 
Court to reduce shearing rates by 10 per cent, the United Graziers' 
Association having asked for a 15 per cent fall. And the ruling was 
in fact based on the principle underlying a 1949 agreement that the 
rates should move in tune with the price of wool. While the AWU 
had accepted this principle as a way of obtaining a share in the 
prosperity of the industry, it rejected the notion that workers' incomes 
should faU whenever the price of wool declined; after all, the cost 
of living did not change in step with the price of wool. After 
Commissioner Donovan decided to reduce shearing rates by 5 per cent 
partly under the influence of the precedent set by the Queensland 
court, the state-wide strike in Queensland grew into a national strike 
when AWU members were instructed to work only at the old, higher 
rates. 
In the beginning graziers' spirits were given a lift when Donovan 
agreed to insert a clause in the award prohibiting bans and limitations 
on work which was being performed under award conditions. This 
encouraged grazier organizations in Victoria, New South Wales and 
South Australia to recruit union and non-union employees who were 
willing to work at the new rates. But defeat appeared to be snatched 
out of the jaws of victory when the High Court decided that those 
provisions in the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
which gave strictly judicial powers to the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration were invalid. Graziers were taken by 
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surprise and wondered how this would weaken resistance to the strike. 
The industrial officer of the Graziers' Federal Council lamented: 'This 
decision deprived the Arbitration Court of its principal powers to 
punish disobedience of awards, in particular the powers to enjoin 
unions to observe awards and the power to punish for contempt of 
Court. These were the principal sanctions on which employers have 
relied for enforcement of awards and their disappearance seriously 
affected the defence of the Award'.^" The Graziers' Federal CouncU 
immediately appealed to the CommonweaUh government to introduce 
legislation rectifying the situation. However, the government had a 
program of arbitration-related legislation, which it was unwilUng to 
change. Amendments to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act had 
been designed with the cooperation of an Advisory Council made 
up of employer and AustraUan Council Trade Unions (ACTU) 
representatives. The government did not want to prejudice its good 
relations with the ACTU by introducing stop-gap, precipitous 
legislation on such a sensitive matter as penal powers, without first 
consulting the unions. 
Woolgrowers were further confounded by a judgement of the High 
Court on 15 June 1956, overruling a decision by Commissioner 
Donovan to extend the coverage of the new federal pastoral industry 
award to include non-unionists. The High Court simply affirmed the 
precedents in this field of labor law. The Graziers' Federal Council 
had applied to Donovan to allow the federal award to include non-
unionists so they would also be required to work at the new lower 
federal rates. As things stood, unionists were covered by the federal 
award and non-unionists by some state awards, which had not been 
modified to take account of the new lower federal rates so large 
numbers of pastoral workers were free to earn the higher, pre-1956 
rates. As has been pointed out, in order to combat the strike, grazier 
organizations were signing-up unionists and non-unionists who were 
wiUing to work as strike-breakers. But employers had to observe the 
New South Wales state award for non-uiuonists. The New South Wales 
state award required a shearing rate of over £ 7 per 100 sheep, whUe 
in February Commissioner Donovan had reduced the federal rate from 
£ 7/6/- to £6/18/6 per 100. The problem for the employers was that 
they would now be paying more to non-unionists who were stiU 
working, than to the unionists who had defied the AWU. This was 
no way to reward loyal employees,and there was some concern that 
disenchantment would drive such men closer to the mUitants in the 
AWU. Also, the reduced rates of pay for which the employers were 
holding out, were lower than those to which non-unionists were 
entitled in New South Wales. 
These legaUties were secondary to an intense struggle which was 
fought out on particular sheep stations. In the permeating heat of 
Queensland's pastoral zone, under the strong leadership of W Gunn 
(later Sir William Gunn), graziers tenaciously defended the new award 
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rate, as teams of volunteers were secured by several big sheds. But 
in the western reaches of the state where the largest stations could 
be found, a number were shearing under the old award. These stations 
had many more sheep to shear, but there were few local shearers and 
therefore less likelihood of finding persons willing to work against 
AWU policy. In order to attract labor even under normal conditions 
these stations had to offer payments which were above the award. 
More isolated and insecure, such graziers and station managers were 
under greater pressure to abandon the discipline of collective 
obligations. WhUe to the north of the state there was soUd support 
for the United Graziers' Association of Queensland, this could not 
be expected to last through the peak shearing period. Nevertheless, 
in AprU 1956 a majority of Queensland sheds were shearing at the 
new rate, and only some 10 per cent at the old rate.^^ However, in 
the Longreach area, traditionally a centre of shearer militancy, graziers 
soon began to lose their resolution. Floods led to further delays of 
the shearing and made it difficult to send volunteer labor from 
Brisbane. Eventually ten sheds in the Longreach district began 
shearing, but with non-union labor. With the aid of 100 shearers 
recruited by the United Graziers' Association, Charleville stations also 
commenced shearing. But by May 1956 a number of big stations with 
15 months of wool on their sheep had to shear at the old award 
rate.'^ ^ In the Roma district where flocks on average consisted of 
3-4,000 sheep, graziers banded together and did the shearing 
themselves.^' Further cracks began to appear in the wall of employer 
unity in the south-west and Warrego areas of Queensland. With 
750,000 sheep three months overdue for shearing, it was not surprising 
that work had begun at the higher rates.^* 
South Australia held firm in the first half of 1956, but the main 
shearing did not begin until August. In April few sheds were shearing 
at the old rates; by May 315,000 sheep had been shorn at the lower 
rates. However, smaller stations were showing a willingness to allow 
shearing at the old rate, and of the 3,230 members in the Stockowners' 
Association of South Australia, 1,700 were smaller owners who had 
flocks of 3,000 or less. Bigger stations were more likely to shear at 
the new, reduced rates. The situation was finely balanced and the 
Stockowners' Association of South Australia described it as follows: 
'most of our men work for themselves or are helped by their sons 
and a few men from outside. . . we will get through the Autumn 
shearing. Unless the trouble is settled, however, we may have difficulty 
with our main shearing.'^' The West Darling was a different kettle 
of fish: 'they have broken badly. They are small holders, and 
practically all the shearing has been done at the old rates.''" This 
should not surprise us, for in the period from 1945 to 1957 South 
Australia witnessed a greater proportionate increase in sheep numbers 
than any of the other states, the number of sheep growing by 44 per 
cent; 81 per cent of this increase was in the lush high rainfall districts. 
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This was partially due to the use of superphosphate and the addition 
of trace elements to improve grasses; there were also substantial 
increases in sheep numbers in wheat-sheep districts. Together with 
the destruction of rabbits, these technical innovations gave rise to 
improved lambing rates and higher yields, whUe also increasing the 
number of sheep which could be carried on what were relatively small 
parcels of land. Pasture improvement could be exploited most 
efficiently by running sheep other than merinos. These other breeds 
benefited from the higher protein content in the new pastures and 
were sources of both wool and meat, unlike merinos which in 
Queensland and large parts of New South Wales were run mainly for 
wool. By producing wheat and meat as well as wool on smaller more 
intensively farmed properties, South Australian growers were less 
vulnerable to slumps in the price of wool than were growers in 
Queensland and New South Wales. So South Australian woolgrowers 
were less affected by the lower prices in 1954-55 and were not as 
unstinting in their desire for a cut in shearing rates. 
In the high rainfall areas of Western Australia, with the exception 
of some hardy soldier settlers who pooled their manpower resources 
and did their own shearing, most stations capitulated and were 
shearing at the old higher rates.'' The major increase in sheep 
numbers in Western Australia in the post-war years was in high rainfall 
areas. As well as excellent wool prices, woolgrowers in Western 
Australia benefitted from a number of technological breakthroughs. 
Land which previously could not be used for grazing was brought 
into production by the use of new pasture species. Action was taken 
to prevent breeding ewes from eating subterranean clover which caused 
disease and reduced their yield of wool. Better methods for sinking 
dams and the mechanization of water deUvery reduced the impact 
of hot and dry summers on the yield of wool per head of sheep, while 
fertilizers and trace elements were used more often. From 1952-53 to 
1956-57, with the exception of 1954-55, the returns on existing 
investments were high enough to allow for further capUal investment 
as family incomes accounted for around 50 per cent of these returns 
after allowing for costs. In addition, properties in the high rainfaU 
areas employed less wage-labor and reUed more on family labor." 
In the Riverina too, resistance to the strike had been weak. A leader 
of the Graziers' Association of Riverina reported: 'At the eastern end 
of the Riverina I foresee a difficulty with the smaller sheds and local 
shearers owing to the great desire of our members to have their sheep 
shorn.' He was 'pretty certain that the majority have no intention of 
sticking to the new Award.' Big sheds were also giving in. This was 
quite damaging to the employers' cause and drew angry reactions from 
the Graziers' Association of New South Wales. In Victoria as weU, 
small graziers appeared to be the weak link in the chain of employer 
solidarity. Contractors, even though they may have been hiring labor 
at the new rates, were offering aU sorts of bonuses and extra payments. 
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Like many of their Riverina colleagues, Victorian graziers could not 
see the wisdom in making sacrifices over what was after all only a 
small amount of money. A dismal scenario of grazier retreat was 
painted by an official of the Riverina association in April 1956: 
I have surveyed the situation from the East to the West of the 
Riverina, visiting every branch and, not withstanding their lip service 
to conciliation and arbitration, numbers of our members intend to 
have their sheep shorn, whatever the cost. They can see the terrific 
lag in shearing in Queensland. They see hundreds of sheep being 
shorn at the old rates, and they are so debauched with prosperity 
that the few shillings involved does not enter into the question. They 
are pushing the long term view completely out of range. . . About 
nine-tenths of Graziers in the South are apathetic and are not long 
sighted in this matter. They do not look to what may happen with 
next year's shearing. The fact remains that numbers of our members 
have always paid more than the minimum award rates. That is 
common knowledge in the Riverina, in Victoria, and in many parts 
of New South Wales. We have no security with our registered or 
unregistered contractors. Most of them are sitting on the fence. . . 
because they do not wish to offend the Australian Workers' 
Union." 
Victorian graziers in the wheat-sheep districts were not dependent 
solely on wool production, although many of the properties ran mainly 
sheep. However, between 1952 and 1955 the area under wheat 
cultivation in acres per property rose steadily, thus signifying a reduced 
reliance on wool for income. There was also a decrease in the number 
of sheep, ewes mated and lambs marked, and in the quantity of wool 
produced in 1952-53 and 1953-54. Total labor costs fell between 
1952-53 and 1954-55, while incomes recovered after the slump of 
1953-54 in the wheat-sheep districts of Victoria, so that by 1955-56 
incomes were on an upswing.'" Such growers were less concerned to 
win the 1956 contest with the AWU. 
The large number of graziers from the pastoral zone of New South 
Wales and Queensland bore the brunt of the strike and had no 
intention of acceding to union demands, despite the capitulation of 
many of their more skittish colleagues. The pastoral zone included 
the western division of New South Wales and the western fringes of 
the Riverina, as well as the central and north-central plains of New 
South Wales. In Queensland it spanned the large sheep stations of 
the north, the south-west and the far west, which together accounted 
for a majority of the state's sheep. The pastoral zone was especially 
suited to merinos and in 1955-56 around 95 per cent of sheep in 
Queensland and around 82 per cent in New South Wales were merinos, 
most of which grazed on land with a low carrying capacity. Graziers 
in this zone had not diversified into cereal production and suffered 
from a low and erratic rainfall, while also relying in many areas on 
native pastures of Umited nutritional value. Their flocks were the 
largest, as were their land holdings. To make economic use of station 
labor it was necessary to have work all year round, and the high 
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number of sheep made this possible. At the same time, remoteness 
resulted in the virtual absence of local labor markets for shearing 
workers such as existed in the high rainfall areas. Lacking the ability 
to adopt alternative land-uses, Queensland graziers in the pastoral 
zone were more vulnerable to price fluctuations for wool and to poor 
seasons. Hence it was not surprising that graziers from the pastoral 
zone in New South Wales and Queensland should be so antagonistic 
to the level of shearing rates, given the fall in the price of wool in 
1954-55, and the further drop in 1955-56. In the pastoral zone of New 
South Wales from 1952 to 1956 average farm income had faUen by 
11 per cent. These decreases in prices and incomes did not affect the 
number of sheep shorn and carried; in 1955-56 they were respectively 
19 per cent and 20 per cent higher than in 1952-53, thus increasing 
the burden of shearing costs on employers who had developed an 
expectation of regularly ascending wool prices and returns. Even more 
confirming of the concerns of pastoral zone graziers was the growth 
in costs as a percentage of returns, and labor was the largest cost in 
the pastoral zone.'^ 
RESULTS AND PROSPECTS 
Internally divided and with an increasing number accepting the 
AWU's demand that they shear at the higher pre-1956 rates, towards 
the latter third of 1956 the employers began negotiations towards a 
compromise with the AWU. It was agreed that the New South Wales 
award rates, which were higher than those initially set by Donovan, 
would apply there, as well as in Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania; in Western Australia the higher 1955 federal rates plus the 
basic wage flow-on constituted the basis for settlement. In due course 
the parties would return to Commissioner Donovan for a 
reconsideration of the federal award. In Queensland by October 1956 
the two sides had returned to the conference table and a new trade-
off was under discussion. The Queensland Premier had the PubUc 
Service Commissioner apply to the Industrial Court to review rates 
of pay for pastoral employees. The court now decided to award a 
shearing rate of £ 7/11/- per 100 sheep and corresponding rises for 
all other categories of shearing labor. This amounted to 9/6 per 100 
more than the rates that would have commenced on 1 January 1956. 
The 1956 strike brought into clearer relief the reactive and discrete 
nature of legal institutions. Judges and arbitration commissioners 
could not intervene in relations between employers and employees until 
they had been asked to do so. Even then their decisions were influenced 
by rules of evidence, precedent and with due regard to the limits of 
their jurisdictions. Their decisions were given form and content by 
differing traditions and arguments. On the one hand, they were made 
within particular jurisdictions. On the other, the judgements of judges 
and arbitration commissioners had wider consequences that they often 
did not care to know about, or could not have anticipated. This was 
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the case with the judgements made by the High Court. Also, 
woolgrowers were troubled by the tangle of complications caused by 
the overlapping of federal and state awards. The federal award 
regulated relations between employers who were either members of 
various registered organizations named in the award or were 
individuals cited as respondents to the award, and employees who were 
unionists and members of the AWU. Otherwise employer-employee 
relations were governed by state awards. Both federal and state awards 
operated in Victoria, New South Wales, Tasmania and Western 
Australia; only some parts of the industry in South Australia were 
covered by the federal award. Members of the AWU were bound by 
the federal award, while non-unionists who worked in the pastoral 
industry were covered by the state award. This meant that employees 
laboring on the same task at the same station received different rates 
of pay, and enjoyed dissimilar overtime and working hours. 
Governments, courts and commissions were subject to fields of 
force which pushed and pulled them in directions unfavorable to the 
immediate interests of graziers. StUl, some use was made of the police 
force. It had assisted the Stockowners' Association of South Australia 
in combating the intimidation of strike-breakers. When the 
Stockowners' Association learned of the bashing of some loyal 
shearers it 'informed the poUce.' A leading member of the 
Stockowners' Association explained: 'We had to get a statement from 
the men. . . We are keeping these men and are claiming the station 
hands' award rates for them. . . Also, we went to the Commissioner 
of PoUce, who is pursuing the matter with the greatest energy. . . the 
best deterrent wUl be to follow up the matter and get substantial 
convictions.' The president of the Graziers' Federal Council of 
Australia agreed that it was necessary to: 'Come out into the open 
and support those who were not obeying AWU directives.''^ While 
some reUance could be placed on the police, unUke in the 1890s when 
another general strike gripped the industry, the arbitration system, 
the caution of politicians and the divisions among the employers 
allowed shearing employees to win a major victory in 1956. 
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